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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE J. ALLEN, for himself and all other 
residents and taxpayers d ToJele C JU:1ty, 
Utah, similarly situated, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
TOOELE COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah; GEORGE WILLIS SMITH, 
GEORGE BUZIANIS and R. STERLING 
HALLADAY, individually and as members 
of the Board of Commissioners of Tocele 
County; ENERGY LEASING SERVICES, 
INC., a Delaware corporation; and THE 
MAGNESIUM PROJECT, a jomt venture, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANI''S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
11297 
This is a class action for a declaratory judgment 
determining questions of the construction and validity 
of a state statute and actions taken by Tooele County 
pursuant to authority contained in the statute. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
The trial court, without a jury, held that the Utah 
Industrial Facilities Development Act (Chapter 29 
Laws of Utah 1967; Title 11, Chapter 17, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953) is constitutional, valid and lawful; 
and that certain agreements negotiated and made be-
tween the defendants, and revenue bonds to be issued 
and sold by Tooele County, are lawful and enforceable 
in all respects. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal and remand 
to the District Court with directions to enter a judgment 
declaring the Utah Industrial Facilities Development 
Act to be unconstitutional and void, and actions taken 
and being taken by the defendants to be unlawful. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statute Involved 
On March 9, 1967, the 37th Utah Legislature 
enacted Senate Bill No. 187, known as the "Utah In· 
dustrial Facilities Development Act," to become eff ec-
tive May 9, 1967, as Chapter 29, Laws of Utah 1967 
(codified as Title 11, Chapter 17, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953) . The sections of the act are the same in 
the session laws as in the code, i.e., Section 1 of Chapter 
2 
29, Laws of Utah 1967, is codified as ll-17-1 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. Section 16, the last section of 
the original act, is a garden variety savings clause that 
does not appear as a section in the code. 
Sections l and 2 of the act are devoted to identi-
fying the act and defining terms used in it. 
Section 3 confers upon municipalities and counties 
the power to acquire and construct property suitable 
for "manufacturing, warehousing, commercial or indus-
trial purposes" other than public utilities; to lease pro-
jects for such rentals and upon such terms and condi-
tions as the governing body deems advisable; to issue 
revenue bonds for the purpose of financing the pro· 
jects; and to grant options to renew leases and to pur-
chase projects. The section prohibits a county or 
municipality from itself operating any project, from 
acquiring any part of a project by condemnation, and 
from acquiring or leasing projects which would com-
pete with telecommunication, electric and natural gas 
utilities. 
Section 4 describes the bonds as limited obligations 
which shall not constitute a general obligation or lia-
bility, or a charge against the general credit or taxing 
powers of, a municipality or county. The section con-
tains additional provisions as to the form of the bonds, 
interest, and registration, and permits inclusion in the 
bonds of other provisions "deemed for the best interests 
of" the issuer. The bonds may be sold at public or pri-
rate sale "as may be determined by the governing body 
3 
to be most advantageous," and the bonds are to be ne-
gotiable. 
Under Section 5 the issuers are directed to secure 
the bonds by "pledge and assignment of the revenues 
out of which such bonds may be made payable," and 
authorizes, in addition, a mortgage covering all or any 
part of the project, a pledge and assignment of the 
lease of such project, and "_such other security device 
as may be deemed most advantageous by the governing 
body issuing the bonds." The issuer is authorized to 
include in the mortgage, among others, provisions re-
lated to fixing of rentals, terms to be incorporated in the 
lease, maintenance and insurance, use of special funds 
from the revenues of the projects, rights and remedies, 
appointment of a receiver upon default in the payment 
of principal and interest on the bonds, and foreclosure 
of the mortgage. In this section it is again expressly 
provided that breach of any agreement shall not impose 
any general obligation or liability, or create a charge 
upon the general credit or taxing powers of a munici-
pality or county. 
Under the provisions of Section 6 bonds may be 
refunded in advance or by exchange of refunding bonds 
to be issued under terms and conditions similar to those 
provided in Sections 4 and 5. 
Section 7 provides that the proceeds from the sale 
of any bond shall be applied only for the purposes for 
which the bonds were issued; that any accrued interest 
and premium received may be applied to the payment 
4 
of principal or interest; and that proceeds not needed 
for the project are to be applied toward payment of 
principal or interest on the bonds. 
The "cost of acquiring or improving any project" 
is defined by Section 8 to include cost of acquisition or 
improvement of real estate, cost of enlarging, construc-
tion, reconstructing, improving, maintaining, equip-
ping, or furnishing the project, including architect or 
engineer's fees, and expenses in connection with authori-
zation, sale and issuance of the bonds, legal fees, fi-
nancial advisors' fees, printing costs, and the interest 
on such bonds during construction, and for a reasonable 
period of time before and after construction. 
Section 9 prohibits the municipality or county from 
commingling bond proceeds, project revenues, and in-
terest, with any other funds of the county or munici-
pality. 
Section 10 declares that property acquired or held 
by the county or municipality under the act is "public 
property used for essential public and governmental 
purposes," and the property, the bonds issued under the 
act, and the income from them are exempted from taxes 
imposed by the state, county, municipality, or any other 
political subdivision in the state. There is an additional 
provision that the exemption shall not extend to "the 
interests" of the private persons, which shall be subject 
to the provisions of 59-13-73 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, or other applicable law. The private entities are 
not exempted from taxation of income from the projects. 
5 
Section 11 contains a prov1s10n that the act shall 
not be be construed as limiting other powers that a 
county or municipality may already have. 
~ection 12 provides thai the bonds are to be legal 
securities that may properly be purchased by puLlie 
officers and public bodies of the state and its political ' 
subdivisions; and that may properly and legally be de-
posited with and received by any state or municipal 
officer for any purpose for which the deposit of bonds 
or obligations of the state is now or may hereafter be 
authorized by law. 
Under the provisions of Section 13 the legislature 
agrees that the state will not hereafter alter, impair or 
limit the rights until the bonds, together with interest, 
are met and discharged and the contracts are fully per-
formed, but that such alteration or impairment may be ~ 
accomplished if provision is made for protection of the 
bond holders or persons entering into contracts with a ,, 
county or municipality. The counties and municipalities 
are authorized to include the legislative pledge in bonds 
and contracts issued and entered into pursuant to the 
statute. 
Section 14 exempts the bonds from provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Section 15 exempts the bonds and projects from 
competitive bidding provisions otherwise applicable to 
sales and purchases of property, construction contracts. 
and sales and purchase of bonds. 
6 
The Planned Project 
After the Utah Industrial Development Facilities 
Act was passed by the Legislature the Tooele County 
Commissioners decided to use the act for development 
of private industry within the county (Tr. 10). No 
formal investigation or hearing was undertaken by the 
county before the decision was made, though some in-
quiries were made by the Commissioners (Tr. 10). The 
inquiries disclosed some facts that would tend to nega-
tive the desirability of the proposed project. Commis-
sioner R. Sterling IIalladay testified that there is a low 
unemployment rate in Tooele County; housing is of 
doubtful availability; Grantsville does not have ade-
quate sewage disposal facilities; and there is serious 
question as to the availability of school rooms. No 
methodical investigation was made to determine the 
effect of the bond issue on future bonding capacity for 
public improvements (Tr. 10-13). It was thought that 
diversification of industry is desirable (Tr. 20). 
The County Commissioners did not meet with any 
group other than The Magnesium Project to discuss 
use of the act to develop private industry in Tooele 
County (Tr. 10). 
Since about the effective date of the act negotia-
tions have been going on between The Magnesium Pro-
ject and Tooele County with respect to issuance of 
County bonds for the financing, acquisition, and con-
struction of an electrolytic minerals extraction plant 
near Great Salt Lake, at an estimated cost of 
~.5:!,000,000. 
7 
Tooele County is neither populous nor wealthy. 
In 1960 the population was 17 ,868 and there has been 
no marked growth since. In 1967 the total assessed 
valuation of property within the county was $28,122,· 
264.00, upon which taxes in the amount of $1,925,078.30 
were levied and approximately $1,900,000.00 collected 
(Ex. P-1). It is expected that the assessed valuation 
for 1968 will be somewhat less than $30,000,000.00, and 
total taxes about $2,000,000.00 (Tr. 14, 18). 
The Magnesium Project is a joint venture the 
interests in which are owned approximately 20% by 
H-K, Inc., a Utah corporation, and 80% by National 
Lead Company, a New Jersey corporation (Tr. 24). 
The financial condition of H-K, Inc., was not shown, 
but National Lead Company is a well-to-do corpora· 
tion capable of obtaining it_s own financing. In 1967 
the assets of the company were valued at more than 
$57 5,000,000, and income before taxes was almost 
$95,000,000 (Ex. D-8). 
The ability to obtain financing for projects such 
as that planned for Great Salt Lake is dependent upon 
the underlying financial strength of the operators of the 
project, and bonds issued for development of the elec· 
trolytic extraction plant, to be readily marketable, 
would have to be guarantied by one or more of the 
members of the joint venture (Tr. 34). Although the 
company could arrange its own financing, it desires 
to use bonds issued by Tooele County because it is 
anticipated that the income from the bonds will be 
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exempt from taxation by the United States and the 
State. Tax-exempt bonds customarily are purchased at 
lower rates of interest than bonds that are not exempt 
(Tr.40). 
Possible availability of tax-exempt bonding, how-
ever, is not the sole (and probably not the primary) 
motivation for location of the project in Tooele County. 
The Great Salt Lake is one of the world's best sources 
of magnesium and lithium; and the Tooele County site 
is strategically located with respect to ponding areas 
and railheads (Tr. 37 -38) . 
Although not all of the agreements between Tooele 
County and The Magnesium Project have been exe-
cuted, two of them have; the others have been reduced 
to writing and agreement reached on substantially all 
of the material terms and conditions to be contained 
in them. 
On March 14, 1968, Tooele County entered into 
a letter agreement (Ex. P-3) with Goodbody & Co., 
a securities dealer, under which the company agreed to 
accept delivery of and pay for not more than $60,000,000 
of bonds at a purchase price of $975 per $1,000 prin-
cipal amount, plus accrued interest, and at a coupon rate 
of 5% per cent, subject to certain conditions. 
On March 18, 1968, an agreement (Ex. P-2) was 
executed by The Magnesium Project and Tooele 
County under which the county agreed to make a search 
for and survey of, and to obtain options on property to 
9 
be used for the project; also to investigate availability 1 
and prepare a report of possible water sources and high-
way locations, and conduct a survey of the labor force. 
To accomplish this the county agreed to utilize its offi. 
cers, agents, and employees, and allocate necessary 
funds. The company agreed to make studies as to the 
"feasibility" of carrying out an electrolytic minerals : 
extraction operation at the proposed site, and to notify 
the county whether it would enter into a lease with the 
county. 
Both of the above agreements referred to a "Lease 
and Agreement" and a "lVIortgage and Indenture of 
Trust," which are to be the governing documents. The 
lease and indenture both have been worked over in con-
siderable detail and it is apparent that the county and 
The Magnesium Project are in substantial agreement 
on the terms to be included in them (Tr. 32-33) . The 
lease consists of 46 pages, and the mortgage and inden-
ture of trust consists of approximately 70 pages of 
printed material. 
Although the agreement of March 18, 1968, re-
ferred to "feasibility" studies to be made by the com-
pany, testimony at the trial indicated that the feasibility 
had been dependent primarily upon the company's 
being able to obtain electric energy at a rate it regarded 
as being· 1ow enough to permit economical operation of 
the project. At the trial there was testimony that the 
company and Utah Power & Light Company, supplier 
of electrical energy, had substantially agreed upon all 
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of the terms of an electrical supply contract and that 
execution of a contract was imminent (Tr. 37). Since 
the trial, newspaper reports indicate that a contract has 
in fact been signed by Utah Power & Light Company 
and The Magnesium Project. It thus appears that the 
county has executed contracts under which it is obli-
gated to spend county money and use county personnel 
in aid of The Magnesium Project. In addition, the 
parties have progressed so far in their negotiations on 
the lease, mortgage, and indenture of trust that it may 
fairly be said that an agreement has been reached, 
whether or not is has been signed. There is a genuine 
controversy between the plaintiff and the defendants 
concerning the validity of the statute, the lease, and the 
bonds, as well as the agreements incidental to them. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The act is unconstitutional because it authorizes 
lending of credit in aid of private enterprises. 
Article VI, Section 31, Utah Constitution, provides: 
"The legislature shall not authorize the State, 
or any county, city, town, township, district or 
other political subdivision of the State to lend its 
credit or subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of any 
railroad, telegraph or other private individual or 
corporate enterprise or undertaking." 
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Proponents of public bonding for the purpose of 
encouraging industry (defendants among them) have 
consistently argued that such constitutional provisions 
do not apply to industrial development bonds for the 
following reasons: ( 1) inasmuch as the development of 
private industry aids the general economy, the bonds 
are for a public purpose, not a "private individual or , 
corporate enterprise or undertaking;" and ( 2) inasmuch 
as the bonds are not charges against the general reve-
nues of a municipality or county, there is no "lending 
of credit." 
The argument that the bonds are not in aid of pri-
vate enterprise should have been laid at rest during 
Utah's constitutional convention. Article VI, Section 
31 did not sneak into the constitution. The Report of 
Proceedings of the Utah Constitutional Convention 
contains lengthy debates about the desirability of such 
an article. Those opposed to the section argued that the 
territory's credit was needed to "build up industry, the 
prosperity and resources of the territory" (Page 909) · 
The section in question was proposed by l\'Ir. Varian 
whose comments included the following: 
"The purpose of my section is to prohibit the 
lending of credit in any way for the furtherance 
of such enterprises as are indicated (Page 952) 
* * * It is a solemn duty, sir, that we have. to 
guard the public revenue and the public property 
from spoilation. We may not farm it out through 
future generations to be disposed of for other '· 
than the necessary purposes of ,government. You 
12 
have it in your power to put into this organic 
law a statement which shall be in accord with 
the prevailing public and financial interests 
everywhere, that no public body, either state nor 
county, city nor township, nor district, shall ever 
burden the people's property, shall ever encum-
ber the people's revenues, with an indebtedness 
designed to aid other than public institutions 
(Page 1001) ." [Emphasis added.} 
Another of the proponents, Mr. Richards, at Page 
913 of the proceedings quoted Cooley, the renowned con-
stitutional lawyer, as follows: 
"It has been well and forcibly said that indi-
viduals and corporations embark in manufac-
tories for the purpose of personal and corporate 
gain. Their purposes and objects are precisely 
the same as those of the farmer, the mechanic, 
or the day laborer. They engage in the selected 
branch of manufactories for the purpose and 
with the hope and expectation not of loss, but of 
profits. The general benefit of the community 
resulting from every description of well regu-
lated labor is of the same character, whatever may 
be the branch of industry upon which it may be 
expended. All useful labors, no matter what the 
field of labor, serve the state by increasing the 
aggregate of its profits, its wealth. There is no-
thing of a public nature." 
The arguments for some form of public aid to pri-
vate industry are the same today as when the constitu-
tion was being considered and adopted. 'f hey are varia-
tions of the latter-day 'Vilson' s ingenuous remark: 
"'Vhat' s good for General Motors is good for the 
, eountry." 
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An incidental public benefit resulting from the 
creation and success of a private enterprise does not 
remove that enterprise from the "private" category and 
convert it into a "public institution." 
A modern day recognition of the difference be-
tween "private" and "public" purposes is found in State 
v. Town of North ft;Jiami, 59 So.2d 779, (Fla., 1952), 
wherein the Supreme Court of Florida said: 
"Every new business, manufacturing plant, or 
industrial plant which may be established in a 
municipality will be of some benefit to the munici-
pality. A new super market, a new department 
store, a new meat market, a steel mill, a crate 
manufacturing plant, a pulp mill, or other es-
tablishments which could be named without end, 
may be of material benefit to the growth, pro-
gress, development and prosperity of a munici-
pality. But these considerations do not make 
the acquisition of land and the erection of build-
ings, for such purposes, a municipal purpose." 
The "lending of credit" argument must also fail. 
The quoted proceedings of the constitutional convention 
show that Section 31 was meant to prohibit the lending 
of credit "in any form," not only to protect the tax 
revenues but also the properties of the state and its sub· 
divisions. Admittedly, some other courts have considered 
similar constitutional provisions and have held that if 
the general taxing power is not obligated for repayment 
of the bonds, there is no "lending of credit." But this 
court has itself recognized that "credit" involves factors 
other than the source from which the funds are to he 
14 
repaid. As stated in Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 
83 Utah 321, 28 P. 2d 161, 169 ( 1933) a case involving 
"revenue" bonds, the court said: 
"Nevertheless, the bonds must be paid when 
due, or city credit will be impaired. With noise-
less foot and steady tread the day of reckoning 
inevitably comes to demand its toll. To a city, 
no less than to a state or individual, untarnished 
credit and an honored name are of inestimable 
worth. No wealth or power which may come to 
a community is of more lasting importance than 
the good name it maintains by keeping its faith 
unbroken by meeting all of its engagements and 
obligations. In spite of the fact that full faith 
and credit of a city is not pledged to payment of 
the revenue bonds, no prudent c1ty will permit 
its promise to pay to go unfulfilled where it has 
received and enjoyed the fruits of the obligation." 
In State v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44, 197 N.E.2d 328, 
(1964), a case involving industrial development revenue 
bonds, the court said: 
"The sale of revenue bonds of the state to raise 
money necessarily involves a borrowing of money 
even though no indebtedness of the state results. 
If the bonds are not paid, the borrowing power 
of the state will as a result be adversely affected, 
even though the bonds do not represent a debt 
of the state. The borrowing power of the state 
is related to the taxing power because, to the 
extent that the state's borrowing power is lessen-
ed, a greater burden will be placed upon its tax-. ,, 
mg power. 
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The Ohio court recognized what has long been ! 
recognized in financial circles, that the interest rate 
payable on bonds is determined in large measure by ' 
competition among bond sellers. If tax free bonds are 
multiplied, the interest payable by municipalities and 
counties on other tax free bonds likely will be increased. 
The result is that municipalities, cities, and counties 
may have to pay higher rates of interest on "legitimate" 
bonds issued to finance public improvements. 
Increased interest and decreased borrowing power 
are not the only elements suggesting a "lending of 
credit" contrary to Section 31. The act is broad enough 
to permit a municipality or county to secure revenue 
bonds by pledge of income from property not acquired 
with bond proceeds. Section 3 (I) permits acquisition 
by devise, gift, or exchange, as well as by purchase , 
from bond revenues. By other provisions of Section 3, 
a project may be constructed on property "owned" by 
the municipality or county and the project may then 
be leased to any person, firm, partnership or corpora-
tion for the operation of a private project. 
Moreover, Section 3 permits municipalities and 
counties to use their funds and their efforts, apart from 
bond proceeds, in aid of private enterprise, and to asswne 
legal and financial obligations in connection with de-
velopment of a project. Indeed, the contract between 
Tooele County and The Magnesium Project (Ex. 
P-2) places a burden upon the county to acquire options 
and to make surveys and investigations of sites, labor 
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markets, and so forth. These additional burdens have 
been recognized as being aids to private enterprise 
which are prohibited by constitutional provisions similar 
to Utah's. 
In State v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 
269 ( 1957), the court held that a statute permitting 
cities to issue industrial development revenue bonds 
violated a constitutional provision against giving or 
lending of credit of the state, saying: 
"It is true that the revenue bonds are not a 
general liability of the city and they ~re not sub-
ject to payment through the exercise of the taxing 
power. But they do cast burdens upon a city 
with reference to their issuance and payment. 
The city and its officers are charged with the 
duty of fixing and collecting the rentals from 
which the revenue bonds are to be paid. This 
necessitates the execution of leases, the fixing of 
rentals, the taking of chattel mortgages on equip-
ment to secure payment of rent, the providing 
of insurance coverage, and the determination of 
payments to be made in lieu of taxes. It imposes 
duties and responsibilities upon the city and its 
officers on matters which are private rather than 
public in character. The issuance of the bonds 
in the name of the city for the payment of the 
cost of the project evidences the fact that the 
credit of the city has been extended. The city is 
the payer of the bonds and it is primarily liable 
for their payment. The bonds become the obli-
gations of the city. The fact that the means of 
payment is limited does not make it any less so. 
A failure of payment is a default by the city. 
The constitutional prohibition does not infer that 
17 
the credit of the State or its political subdivisions 
may be given or loaned except when a general 
liability exists. The prohibition clearly provides 
that the credit of a state may not be given or ! 
loaned to an individual, association, or corpora-
tion under any circumstances. * * * It seems clear 
to us that the revenue bonds are issued by the 
city in its own name to give them a marketability 
and value which they would otherwise not pos-
sess. If their issuance by a city is an inducement 
to industry, some benefits must be conferred, or 
it would be no inducement at all. Such benefits, 
whatever form they may take, necessarily must 
be based on the credit of the city. The loan of 
its name by a city to bring about a benefit to a 
private object, even though general liability does 
not exist, is nothing short of a loan of its credit." 
In the present case, testimony of an officer of The 
l\1agnesium Project substantiates that the name of the 
county, its credit, is important in connection with the 
borrowing-important because it leads to a tax exemp-
tion on the bonds; important because tax exemption 
results in a lower interest rate. 
In 1959 Idaho enacted an industrial development 
act very like Utah's. The act was held unconstitutional 
by that state's Supreme Court in Village of Moyie 
Springs, Idaho, et al. v. Aurora Manufacturing Co., 
82 Idaho 337, 353 P .2d 767 ( 1967) , in a lengthy 
opinion in which the court considered all of the cus-
tomary arguments. With respect to "lending of credit" 
it said: 
"It is obvious that one of the prime purposes 
of having the necessary bonds issued by it in the 
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name of the municipality is to make them more 
readily salable on the market. Thus the credit 
of the municipality is extended in aid of the pro-
ject, regardless of the limitations placed upon 
the remedy of the purchaser * * *" 
The court was not swayed by decision_s of other 
jurisdictions upholding industrial development revenue 
acts, observing that the decisions "read like apologies 
to constitutional limitations, dictated by expediency." 
The contemplation of the Utah Industrial Facilities 
Development Act is that the municipalities and coun-
ties will issue their bonds for the acquisition and con-
struction of projects to be operated by private enter-
prise, and that they may not operate the projects 
themselves. It was recognized in State v. Town of 
North Miami, 59 So.2d 779, Fla., (1952) that as 
soon as the bonds are sold by the municipality, the 
moneys received become public moneys and their use 
for the construction of a project to be operated by 
private enterprise is, in essence, the use of public moneys 
for private purpose prohibited by organic law. 
Not content with permitting municipalities and 
counties to lend their credit for development of projects 
in which they are interested, the legislature has em-
powered all public bodies to lend their credit. Section 
12 makes such bonds "securities in which all public 
officers and public bodies of the state and its political 
subdivisions may invest." An "investment" in such bonds 
~call it what you will-is a lending of credit to the 
enterprise; and if the bonds are purchased by the State 
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there would be a violation of Article XIV, Section 6 
' 
which provides that "the State shall not assume the 
debt, or any part thereof, of any county, city, town, 
or school district." 
In arguing that industrial development bonds are 
for a valid public purpose, proponents assert that the 
economy generally will be benefited, and some evidence 
to that effect has been introduced in this case. But 
showing of a public benefit in the instant case (if one 
is shown) does not save the act because the act itself 
requires neither benefit nor purpose. The state has not 
established any standards as to what is or is not a public 
purpose, and it cannot be assumed that private indus· 
trial development, per se, i_s one. The act does not 
require, and in this instance the county did not make, 
any findings with respect to the total impact of the 
project upon county government. As pointed out in 
M. M. Smith et al., v. State of Georgia et al., 222 Ga. 
552, 150 S.E. 2d 868, 871: 
"* * * appellants emphasize that this amend· 
ment does not limit the activities of the county 
in furnishing facilities to private enterprise sole· 
ly on those occasions to relieve unemployment, 
or for any other public purpose, with which co~· 
clusion we agree. This amendment would permit 
the county to issue bonds for a purely private 
purpose; for example to secure funds to con· 
struct a building or plant to be leased to and 
occupied by an already existing and operat!ng 
business with a perfectly adequate buildmg 
which would perform the same functions, em· 
ploy the same number of people, and add nothing 
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in the way of industry, or alleviate unemploy-
ment, or otherwise contribute to the public good. 
* * * This amendment does not, as appellees 
argue, provide for the promotion and develop-
ment of new industry in the county. New in-
dustry might be developed, but there is nothing 
in the act which requires that the funds be used 
for development of new industry, or to relieve 
unemployment or to provide new jobs so that its 
citizens may be furnished employment and not 
be forced to leave the county to find employment, 
or for any other public purpose." 
Finally, Article VI, Section 31 is violated by 
Section 3 ( 4) of the act under which counties or munici-
palities may grant to the lessee of any project an option 
to purchase the project or to renew any lease for a 
nominal sum. It is easy to see a situation in which the 
county has become the owner of a property of substan-
tial value. I ts opportunity to sell the property without 
any safeguards as to price or bidding, or to lease the 
property for a nominal sum, is tantamount to making 
a gift to a private enterprise, at least insofar as the 
fair rental value of the property exceeds the rent re-
served, or the fair market value exceeds the purchase 
price in the option. 
II 
The act is unconstitutional because it permits muni-
cipalities and counties to grant privileges or immuni-
ties to private companies. 
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Article I, Section 23 of the Utah Constitution pro· 
vides: 
"No law shall be passed granting irrevocablv . 
any franchise, privilege, or immunity." · 
Inasmuch as the legislation permits municipalities 
and counties to grant to private enterprises the right : 
to use public property for long periods of time there 
seems to be little question that the act permits the • 
I 
granting of privileges or immunities by municipalities 
and counties. These terms have been interpreted with 
some breadth by the court. See Thomas v. Daughters 
of the Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477. 
We recognize, however, that most of the decisions 
applying Article I, Section 23, have been concerned 
with the question of whether a privilege or immunity 
1 
granted by the state or one of its political subdivisions i 
has been granted "irrevocably." In Section 13 of the , 
act there is a provision that the State of Utah agrees 
with the holder of any bonds issued under the act that 
the state "will not alter, impair or limit the rights thereby 
vested until the bonds, together with applicable interest 
are fully met and discharged and such contracts are 
fully performed." Unquestionably such provision binds 
the hands of future legislatures and violates Section 23. 
III 
The act constitutes special legi8lation, not of uni-
form operation, and constitutes an unlawful delegation 
of legislaitve power. 
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The act as written runs counter to three constitu-
tional provisions which overlap in some degree and 
should be considered together. Article VI, Section 26 
of the Utah Constitution provides: 
"The legislature is prohibited from enacting 
any private or special laws in the following cases: 
... 16. Granting to an individual, association 
or corportaion any privilege, immunity or fran-
chise ... " 
Article I, Section 24: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uni-
form operation." 
Article VI, Section I: 
"The legislative power of the state shall be 
vested: 
"I. In a senate and house of representatives 
which shall be designated the legislature of the 
State of Utah. 
"2. The people of the State of Utah as here-
inafter stated . . " 
In addition, Article V, Section I, provides for a 
~eparation of powers as between the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial. 
The above sections should be considered together, 
because the act, taken as a whole, includes some classi-
tications which are unreasonable, fails to set out legis-
lati\'e standards for the determination of the need for 
''projects" and, by grants of power to counties, permits 
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them to proceed through "special legislation" toward 
a development of industry they deem desirable. 
The concept of "special legislation" has been before 
this court in a number of cases. In Allen v. 1'rueman,, 
100 Utah 36, 110 P.2d 355 (1941), a statute allowing 
1 
owners of trademarks and trade names to invoke crimi- i 
nal procedure of search and seizure to protect civil · 
rights was held to have granted a special privilege and 
1 
was therefore invalid under subdivision 16 of Article 
VI, Section 26. An act allowing 70% of the barbers 
in an area to fix prices and hours was held invalid on 
similar grounds in Revne v. Trade Commission, 113 
Utah 155, 192 P.2d 563 ( 1948). See also Justice v. 
Standard Gilsonite Company, 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.2d 
97 4 ( 1961) , wherein a provision of the Industrial Corn· 
mission Act requiring payment of wages to separated 
employees within 24 hours after separation violated 
Section 26 for the reason that it excluded banks and 
mercantile houses without any justification for such , 
exclusion. In Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 ~tab I 
2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 ( 1962), the Civic Auditonum 
1 
Act was held to have violated Section 26 because it 
applied only to cities of a population of 250,000 or over. I 
The need for uniformity of legislation has been 
1 
recognized in other cases. In Orem City v. Payne, lo 
Utah 2d 355, 401 P.2d 181 (1965) and Roe v. Sall 
Lake City, ____ Utah 2d ____ , 437 P.2d 195, legislation 1 
has been held to be unconstitutional because of classi· . 
fications and exclusions which had no apparent justi· 
fication. 
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The Utah Industrial Facilities Development Act 
is offensive to these various constitutional provisions 
for a number of reasons. In the first place, the act 
contains some express exclusions, without a reasonable 
distinguishing basis. 
Section 3 of the act prohibits municipalities and 
counties from financing projects "for telecorrununica-
tion facilities, the generation, transmission, or distribu-
tion of eletcric energy beyond the project site or the 
production, transmission, or distribution of natural 
gas." There is no apparent reason why industry gen-
erally should be subjected to the competition engendered 
by participation of municipalities and counties in private 
enterprise, while those listed in Section 3 are not. The 
exclusion cannot be justified on the ground that these 
businesses are regulated utilities, since other regulated 
utilities are not excluded and might take advantage of 
the act. The act also amounts to special legislation in 
that it exempts these particular bonds from provisions 
I I 
1 
\ of the Uniform Commercial Code and exempts the 
\ 
bonds and construction from public laws placing upon 
1 
municipalities and counties the burden of requiring 
. I 
· I competitive public bidding. 
n l 
Implicit in the special legislation concept is a 
,ti· 
matter involved with the practical application of the 
statute, which in turn is concerned with the delegation 
51• . of legislative power without proper standards. It is 
:1pparent that a county or municipality seeking to use 
1hr act is not required to make any particular findings 
)11 
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about public purpose or public benefit. It is free to 
negotiate with whomever it wishes-whenever it wisheb 
-and to arrive, in a substantially unfettered discretion. 
at such provisions for leases, bonds, repayments, optiorn 
to renew leases, and so forth, as it sees fit. There is no 
provision in the act authorizing private industries to 
apply for the treatment or setting any standards by 
which the county or municipality can determine to • 
whom the benefits of the act will be extended. As i! 
is doubtful that any county or municipality could keep 
on heaping bond issue upon bond issue, only those for 
who are able to move quickly will be able to take advan· 
tage of the act. 
The county, because of the void spaces in the act 
is free to operate in the following areas: the fixing of 
interest; minimum prices at which bonds may be sold; 
extension of projects beyond the boundaries of the 
county without limitation as to distance; agreement to 
use other security devices without limitation; amount 
of rentals to be obtained (since the act does not even 
require that rentals be sufficient to pay principal and 
interest on the bonds.) 
IV 
The act would allow municipalities and counties 
to contravene constitutional debt limit pro·cisions and 
for that rea.Yon i.s invalid. 
Article XIY, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
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"No debt in excess of the taxes for the current 
year shall be created by any county or subdi-
vision thereof, * * * or by any city, town or 
village or any subdivision thereof in this State; 
w1less the proposition to create such debt, shall 
have been submitted to a vote of such qualified 
electors as shall have paid a property tax therein, 
in the year preceding such election, and a ma-
jority of those voting thereon shall have voted 
in favor of incurring such debt." 
Article XIV, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
"When authorized to create indebtedness as 
provided in Section 3 of this Article, no county 
shall become indebted to an amount, including 
existing indebtedness exceeding two per centum 
of the value of the taxable property therein 
* * * no part of the indebtedness allowed in this 
section shall be incurred for other than strictly 
county, city, town or school district purposes 
* * *" 
' Both of these provisions will be violated by the pro-
posed financing. Respondents have argued that the 
financing will fall within the "special fund" doctrine 
enunciated in earlier Utah cases and hence there is no 
riolation of Sections 3 and 4. The act, however, goes 
much further than the proceedings involved in those 
cases. The court has, in fact, recognized that the special 
fund doctrine is not applicable where the bonds are 
Payable out of the ~evenues of both an existing and an 
expanded system. See F jeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 
Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144 (1933) and Wadsworth v. San-
la711in City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933). The 
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legislature in enacting the so-called Granger Act als0 
recognized the limitation when it provided for alloca-
tion of revenues attributable to previously existing 
facilities separately from those attributable to any pro.; 
posed improvements or additions to such facilifo. 
From the evidence adduced at the trial, there can be 
no doubt that the amounts involved are far greater than· 
would be allowed by Sections 2 and 3. The total amounl 
of bonds to be issued far exceeds two per cent of the 
assessed valuation of Tooele County. It would, in fad, 
be double the total valuation. Moreover, the act does 
not preclude a municipality or county from constructing 
projects on property already owned by them, purchased 
by them with public funds, acquired by exchange, or 
given to them. Inasmuch as the bonds may be secured 
in part by a f oreclosable mortgage on the project, it is 
entirely possible that property other than that acquireo 
with bond revenues would be charged with the deLt, 
and the municipality or county would lose property it 
already had. Thus it cannot logically be argued that 
indebtedness of the municipality or county will not be 1 
created, or that the proceedings come strictly within 
the special fund doctrine. 
v 
The act is unconstitidional because it grants for· I 
bidden tax exemptions and allows unexempt tangi/Jfr I 
property in the state to escape taxation. i 
Sections 2, 3, and 10 of Article XIII of the Utali' 
Constitution all insist upon equality of taxation in thii' 11 
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11. 
I 
i 
state. Certain exemptions are provided by Section 2 
but none of them is involved in this case. It provides: 
"All tangible property in this state not exempt 
under the laws of the United States, or under 
this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to 
its value * * *" 
Section 3 provides in part that: 
"The legislature shall provide by law a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all 
tangible property in this State, according to its 
value in money." 
Section IO provides: 
"All corporations or persons in this State, or 
doing business herein, shall be subject to taxation 
for State, County, School, Municipal, or other 
purposes, on the real and personal property 
owned or used by them within the Territorial 
limits of the authority levying the tax." 
The scheme of Section 2 is that all tangible property 
it in the state not specifically exempted by the constitu-
n tion (or the laws of the United States) shall be taxed 
equally and fully. No exemption is provided under 
the constitution for industrial plants. The fact that the 
i·· I pbnts or projects will technically be owned by the muni-
l I :1pality or county should be of no moment, for a~ stated 
.t in the dissenting opinion in Village of Demming v. 
I llosdreg, 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 ( 1956) "The fea-
h. ture of municipal ownership is a sham." The real owner 
11 Will he the private business entity. 
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Section 10 of the act exempts from taxation all I 
property acquired or held by that county or munici. ; ]E 
pality under the act and such property together witl1 i a 
the bonds and the income from them are exempt from '. g 
all taxes imposed by the State of Utah or any of its Z' 
political subdivisions. It then allows a three-prong 1 
exemption-each resulting in discrimination. While the g 
section does provide that the "interests" of any private st 
person or firm are not exempt and makes such "inter- ~l 
ests" subject to the provisions of Section 59-13-73 t1 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 the legislature must have 31 
intended to grant an exemption not theretofore be· ti 
stowed, and it would seem that the tax on such proper!)' ti 
would be less than if it were owned outright by the f( 
private business entity. Otherwise there would hare 1 
been no need for the exclusionary language of Section I hi 
10 of th: act. If ~ecti~n 59-13-73. were intended to I ti 
apply without qualification, the legislature need only \1 
have said so. Then the tax would have been the same 
as "if the possessor or user were the owner thereof." 1 ~· 
The same thing would apply under Section 3. If, a~ 
Cl 
the act provides, the property of the project is exempt 
from all taxation and only the "interests" of the private 
business entity is taxed, likely there will not be a 
uniform and equal rate of taxation on the property 
according to its value in money. There is nothing in 
the act to define the term "interests" or to indicate 1 
how it is to be determined. Thus, each individual asssesor 1 
will be left the choice of applying the section according 
1 
to his understanding of the term. 
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This court has, on several occasions repudiated 
legislation because it conflicted with one or more of the 
aboYe constitutional provisions. For example, in Foul-
ger v. State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 165, 397 P.2d 
298, the court, with little discussion, held that Freeport 
Legislation was unconstitutional and the tax exemption 
granted by the legislation was invalid by reason of said 
sections. See also Duchesne City v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 and Moon Lake Elec-
trical Association v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 
384, 345 P.2d 612. In the latter case, an act which limited 
the ad valorem tax on electrical cooperatives to $50 
times the miles of line of the cooperative was held invalid 
1e for the reason that it conflicted with Sections 2 and 3. 
The court noted that under those sections, the tax must 
111 be based on the cash value of the properties held, and 
:: I that the desirability of the legislation was immaterial. 
;e I In Industrial Development Authority v. Southers, 
155 S.E.2d 326 (Va., 1967) a somewhat similar act was 
held unconstitutional on the basis it conflicted with a 
a~ 
',''I 
pt constitutional provision that: 
.te 
ty 
in 
"All taxes, whether state, local or municipal, 
shall be uniform for the same class of subjects 
within the same territorial limits of the authority 
levying the tax." 
tie The court said : 
:or 
I 
nu· i 
~ 
"The idea of taxation imports equality of ap-
portionment * * * it is this which distinguishes 
taxation from arbitrary exaction* **exemption 
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of the property of one person casts an inequitablt 
burden on others not thus graciously favored .• 
VI 
The act violates various other provisions of t/11 
Utah and Federal Constitutions and cannot be upheld 
The most apparent constitutional objections to tlit 
act have been brought to the court's attention. Yet. 
there are others, which to no lesser degree require invali· 
dation of the act and the proceedings taken under it. 
Article VI, Section 29, of the Utah Constitution 
prohibits the legislature from delegating "to any special 
commission, private corporation or association, an} 
power to make, supervise or interfere with any munic· 
ipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether 
held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a 
capitol site, or to perform any municipal functions.'· 
Inasmuch as the private corporation would operate 
property of the county or municipality it cannot be i 
gainsaid that it would not only be supervising ana 
interfering with a municipal improvement and property. 
but also that it in effect would be performing a munici· \ 
pal function. Moreover, the act allows upon default, a 
trustee or receiver to take charge of the property witli 1
1 
power to charge and collect rents, and apply the rere· 
nues. He would have custody of and disburse public I 
funds, and would otherwise control and manage public I 
property and revenues - in violation of the abW. 
sections. 
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olt Several decisions of this court invalidating legisla-
d • tion under Section 29 are County Water System v. Salt 
Lake City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P.2d 285; Barnes v. Lehi 
City, 7 4 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878; and Logan City v. 
t/11 
M 
tlit 
'et. 
a]i. 
it. 
ion 
~ial 
tll)' 
1ic· 
her 
Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961. 
Article I, Section 24 Utah Constitution provides: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uni-
form operation." 
As stated under Point II, the act allows munici-
palities to issue bonds to finance certain industrial pro-
jects but specifically excludes others without any justi-
fiable reason. For that reason, as well as the fact that 
only a favored few will, as a practical matter, be able 
tu take advantage of the act, it is violative of Section 24. 
There is nothing in the act which authorizes private 
ta d in ustry to apply for its benefits or sets any standards 
15
' by which the county or municipality can determine to 
·ate 
whom such benefits will be accorded. Thus they can 
be i 
pick and choose to whom they will grant favorable 
1110 treatment. 
iici· \ The act also runs counter to Article VI, Section 5, 
t, a Utah Constitution which sets forth the powers that the 
vitl111 legislature may validly confer upon municipalities. There 
;re, is nothing in Section 5 which would authorize them to 
blic I finance projects for private business enterprise or issue 
blk I bouds payable for revenues derived from property not 
1W constituting public utilities, particularly when secured 
1 
by foreclosable mortgages on such property. Section 5 
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was held to have required invalidation of legislation iu '. s1 
Backman v. Salt Lake County, supra., dealing with tt1e, Ji 
Civic Auditorium and Sports Arena Act of 1961 a111J ! ti 
in Nance v. Mayflower Taverns, Inc., 106 Utah 517,· p 
150 P.2d 773. In the latter case the court stated. i p 
tJ 
"The constitution, Article VI, Section 5 grants' 
to cities forming charters pursuant to the pro· 1 
cedures outlined in Section 5 of Article XI the f1 
power to exercise 'all powers relating to mwii· h 
cipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce within ci 
its limit, local police, sanitary and similar regu· 
lation which does not conflict with the general a 
law * * * o 
ti 
"Neither the statute nor the constitution 
authorizes municipalities to legislate in regard P 
to civil rights.," p 
\' 
There is nothing in the constitution which author· 
izes municipalities to have the powers conferred by the 1 
act and it cannot therefore be sustained. i 
I t 
Another provision which is violated by the act ano \ 
the proposed proceedings thereunder is Article XIV. I f 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution which provides that: 
''All moneys borrowed by, or on behalf of the 1 
State or any legal subdivision thereof, shall be I 
used solely for the purpose specified in the ]a\\ 
authorizing the loan." 
In Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2(11 
591 this court held that restrictive provisions in con·, 
struction contracts let by Salt Lake City which increase(! ' 
the cost of such project without enhancing its value con·\ 
I 
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stituted a pro-tanto diversion of funds and hence vio-
lated Section 5. The same type of situation prevails in 
' this case. Section 15 of the act renders inapplicable to 
projects financed thereunder any laws or regulations 
, purporting to require the letting of construction con-
tracts by advertisement and public competitive bidding. 
This makes it possible for public funds to be diverted 
from their intended purpose because of unnecessarily 
high construction costs caused by negotiated rather than 
competitive letting of contracts. Also, Section 3 includes 
a great number of things which are "deemed" to be part 
of the costs of acquiring or improving a project. Al-
though some of them may be necessary for such pur-
poses, others would not enhance the value of any 
projects and would constitute an unconstitutional di-
Yersion of funds. 
The act also violates Article I, Section 2, of the 
Ptah Constitution, and the 5th and 14th Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, in that it would de-
prive plaintiff of his property without due process of 
law for the reason that it involves an inequality of taxa-
tion, and grants tax exemptions to some persons that 
will not be available to others and is discriminatory. 
Plaintiff, as a taxpayer of Tooele County will suffer 
loss if there should be a failure on the part of the county 
to recoup all the money it has expended. 
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VII 
The portion of the act authorizing investrnent u:i 
the state, its political subdivisions and others in bond1 
issued under the act is unconstitutional, is not severault 
from the rest of the act, and renders it invalid. 
The respondents have argued and the trial court 
agreed that Section 12 of the act, which authorize~, 
the ,state, its political subdivisions and all public bodies; 
thereof, as well as banks, trustees and other fiduciaried 
to purchase said bonds, is not involved in this present 
I 
case inasmuch as Tooele County has indicated that i1 
does not intend to invest therein. This doe_s not meari, 
however, that the state or other political subdivisions 
will not do so. And unless the section is 'patently sever-
able from the rest of the act, the question is not so mucli 
what will be done as what can be done under it. A~ 
stated in Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 136, no P.2u 
355 (1941) "We are concerned not so much with whal1 
was done under the act and the facts presented by thi1\ 
case, as with what it authorized to be done * * *" ' 
Section 12 seems to be an integral part of the act 
It is designed to aid the marketability of the bonds and 
certainly without such help, the act will lose much o! I 
its efficacy. Thus, the court could not say that without 
such provision the act would nevertheless have beeu I 
passed. And if the state or one of its political subdiri· I 
sions purchase the bonds and default occurs, they wi~ I 
suffer the loss. In a very real sense, they will haitl 
assumed an obligation of the county or municipality int 
contravention of the constitution. I 
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CONCLUSION 
In this case the plaintiff challenges the validity 
nd.i of action taken and being taken by Tooele County in 
iult · · d f 1 the negotiation an execution o agreements re ating to 
' the sale of revenue bonds, execution of mortgages, and 
JUrl entry into a lease with an option to purchase. But the 
ize~: inquiry must not be limited to the question of whether 
dies1 Tooele County, under properly enacted enabling legis-
sied lation, might proceed as they have proceeded in encour-
1 
ient ing the advent of new industry into the county. A 
:t i1 necessary pre-requisite for any action by the county 
ear1, with regard to the issuance of revenue bonds, the acqui-
ioru sition and construction of projects, and the leasing of 
ver· such projects with options to renew or options to pur-
mcli chase, is the prior enactment of a statute which is within 
A~ the power of the legislature to enact, and the power of 
).2u the legislature must be determined by examining the 
vhal I constitutional limitations placed upon it. 
this\ Even if a "public purpose" is found in the encour-
agement of new industry, generally, for the State of 
act Utah, existence of such a public purpose does not give 
and the legislature carte blanche to pursue the public pur-
li o! 
houtl 
beeu I 
iiri· I 
wi~ I 
1ia1t I 
r in 
I 
pose by unconstitutional means. Statutes enacted by it 
in order to further the public purpose, as the legislature 
sees it, must nevertheless conform to the express inhibi-
tions and prohibitions of the Constitutions of Utah and 
the United States. 
For this reason, the court must consider not only 
the actions taken by Tooele County and The Magne-
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sium Project with respect to the particular bond issu
1 
involved here, but must give consideration to the legii· 0 
lation itself, i.e., was it within the power of this legi~· 
lature to validly enact the Utah Industrial Facilitie: 
Development Act. To make this determination the at'' 
itself must be considered as a whole. It is plaitniffa 1 
contention that the constitutional flaws in this piece ol a 
legislation are so numerous that the entire act must fall.! a 
It is arguable, if not clear, that the unconstitutiona%[ n 
of Section 12 alone, since it directly affects the market·' 
ability of industrial development revenue bonds, woulc e 
be held to invalidate the entire statute. But Section I~ 
is only one of the flaws in the statute. As pointed out 
above, it is replete with violations of express constitu. I) 
tional provisions. ,.· 
, e 
Moreover, we do not concede and we do not belirn 
the record shows that the development of industi} 
without the establishment of legislative standards a~ tn) s 
the areas in which, and the circumstances under wh1cli, \ 
industry will be brought into a particular count), ( s 
serves any public purpose. And the facts introduced at I 
the trial in this case indicate tha~ the commis~ioner: oi ! 
Tooele County did not make an mdependent mvest~ga· r r 
tion as to the total effect of The Magnesium ProJeri 
on the county and the public facilities which must hi I f 
maintained by it. Although employment might be in· f 
creased, the evidence indicated that the county is iii 1 
equipped to handle any great influx of employees, :ithtr I 
by way of housing, schooling, or sewage disp.osal. f~cilit I f 
ties. The unemployment rate is low and it 1s <l1fficnl ! 
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su1. to justify a participation of the county in development 
;ii· of a private project in the absence of some local situa-
~1~. tion which demands the development of new industry. 
tie: 
at', Issuance of industrial development revenue bonds 
ff) 
1 
by municipalities and counties has some effects which 
. 
01 
are thought by responsible opinion to be less than desir-
all. ! able. As pointed out in "Municipal Industrial Develop-
lit![ ment Bonds," 19 Vand. L. Rev. 25 (1965) such bonds 
, have been officially criticized by the Investment Bank-~et. 
ulc ers Association of America, the Municipal Finance 
1 ~ Officers Association, and the Municipal Law Section of 
out the American Bar Association. 
itu. I 
! It is not self-evident that industrial development in 
mry area is a public benefit. As pointed out in the 
Vanderbilt Law Review article, "It is a long way from 
ti} a small, depression born measure in Winona, Missis-
; 
1111 sippi, to the multi-mililon dollar project in a large, 
ic!1,( already prosperous city." To enact legislation of this 
1t)· ( sort, the legislature should set forth the public policy 
'. ~; ( basis for authorizing bonds, if they are otherwise valid, 
( so that arbitrary action by municipalities and counties 
ga· r may be avoided and the citizens and taxpayers, as well 
ieri as competitors of contemplated industries, might have 
hi I some assurance that the bonds are genuinely being 
in· f issued for a "public purpose" instead of in aid of a 
iii 
1 strictly private enterprise. 
~;;:.1 
:1111 I 
. I 
!, 
And finally, the act must fail because it violates the 
rxpress provision of the Utah Constitution that the 
39 
State shall not authorize any municipality or county I: 
lend its credit in aid of any private enterprise. i 
The statute and the actions taken and proposed 1
11 
be taken under it by Tooele County and The .Magnr ! 
sium Project should be held invalid because in contrai 
I 
vention of the Constitutions of Utah and the Unite111 
States. 
Respect£ ully submitted, 
BRYCE E. ROE 
RALPH L. JERMAN 
510 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and ( 
Appellant I 
' ! \ 
ADDENDUM 
I 
After the type was set and the brief paged. wr\ 
discovered another recent case dealing with industria
11
1 
development bonds: Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus I_ 
trial Development Financing Authority, ____ N.C. · i 
159 S.E. 2d 745 (1968). The case holds the Nortl1/ 
Carolina bonding statute unconstitutional because not I 
involving a "public purpose." It also contains an excfl· 
lent history of industrial development bonds and ]iii ' 
gation about them. 
1 
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